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THIRn state legislatures have now approved, and
more are considering, resolutions petitioning for a
constitutional convention that would require a bal-
anced federal budget on a fiscal year basis. The U.S.
Congress is also considering a similar resolution and
appears mindful, especially in deliberations on Presi-
dent Reagan’s proposed tax and budget cuts, of wide-
spread public demand to eliminate federal govern-
ment deficits.
Many discussions of federal government deficits
maintain that deficits cause inflation. The 1979 Mis-
souri State Senate Resolution No. 13, for example,
states, “. ..it is widely held that fiscal irresponsibility
at the federal level, and the resulting inflation is the
greatest threat which faces our Nation today” (italics
added). This article explicitly investigates the linkage
between deficits and inflation to analyze whether
government deficits cause inflation. This linkage is
discussed within a framework in which inflation is a
monetary phenomenon. In this framework, there are
two separate channels through which deficits are
linked to inflation — through their impacts on the
stock of money in the economy, and on an individual’s
desire to hold money balances.
THE CAUSE OF INFLATION
On the simplest level, inflation results from “too
much money chasing toofew goods.” While this theory
has been widely cited, a number of specifics must be
explained. First, as used here, “money” refers to a set
of assets that can generally be used as a means of
payment. In the United States, money is usually meas-
ured as the coin and currency circulating in the econ-
omy plus deposits held in transaction or checking
counts.’ This definition of money differs considerably
‘The measure of money that most closely corresponds to this
definition is MIB, recently developed by the Federal Reserve
Board of Governors. For a description of this measure as well
as other newly developed measures, see H. W. Hafer, “The
New Monetary Aggregates,” this Review (Febmary 1980),
pp. 25-32.
from the common conception of money as a synonym
for wealth or affluence. An individual can be wealthy
(owning vast amounts of real estate, stocks, bonds,
antiques, etc.), yet at the same time hold little wealth
in the form of money as defined here.2
The total amount ot money in the economy is de-
termined primarily by monetary authorities — in the
United States, this is the Federal Reserve System.
Since all commercial banks and thrift institutions that
issue transaction or checking deposits are required to
hold a specific fraction of these deposits as reserves,
the Federal Reserve can cause changes in the amount
of these deposits either by changing reserve require-
ments on these deposits or by directly changing the
level of reserves. The Federal Reserve most often uses
the latter technique in controlling the money stock.
This is accomplished by changing the level of reserves
through “open market operations,” that is, buying gov-
ernment securities in financial markets to increase re-
serves or selling securities to decrease reserves.
When the Federal Reserve wants to increase bank
reserves, for example, it contacts dealers or financial
institutions that are willing to sell their government
securities. In exchange for the securities, the Federal
Reserve credits the financial institution’s commercial
bank with additional bank reserves equal to the value
of the securities. The commercial bank,in turn, credits
the institution’s account. The net result is that the
2
Anecdote has it that the Diners Club credit card originated
when some wealthy individuals went to dinner at a posh
restaurant and, upon receiving the bill, discovered that col-
lectively they lacked sufficient money to pay the tab. Luckily
for the group, they were recognized and their credit was ac-
cepted. Some member of the group, recognizing that a formal-
ized credit line would be preferrable, thus started the Diners
Club,
While this anecdote clearly points out the difference be-
tween money and wealth, it should also be noted that credit
cards themselves are not money. This is not to say that credit
cards are not generally used to initiate the purchase of goods
and services. Rather, it recognizes that the use of credit cards
simply postpone.s the exchange of money for the goods and
services obtained; individuals still pay for goods and services
with money.
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Federal Reserve has more government securities, the
commercial bank has larger reserves, and the dealer
has larger deposits with the commercial hank. Both
bank reserves and the money stock have increased, In
addition, the commercial bank finds that it is holding
reserves in excess of what it is required to hold. Thus,
the bank can lend this excess to borrowers, further
increasing the money stock.
Although the Federal Reserve affects the money
supply by buying or selling government securities
(federal debt), there is no direct link between federal
government deficits (financed by issuingfederal debt)
and Federal Reserve open market operations. Since a
1951 accord between the Federal Reserve and the
Treasury, the Federal Reserve is no longer directly
responsible for stabilizing government secnrity prices
or for purchasing any given portion of the public
debt. Consequently, federal deficits do not require
that the Federal Reserve purchase more government
securities; therefore, federal deficits, per se, need not
lead to increases in bank reserves or the money supply.
While growth in the stock of money in the economy
is a major deternilnant of inflation, it represents only
one side of the money market. To determine whether
there is “too much” money in the economy, the other
side of the market—the demand for money — must
also be considered. “Too much” money results only
when the amount of money people have exceeds the
amount they wantto hold.
The demand for money is a demand to hold money
balances. Everyone, of course, would like to have
more money — to buy more goods and services or
other assets. This is notthe demand for money as used
in this article. For our purposes, individuals demand
money only to the extent they desire to hold a portion
of their wealth in the form of monetary assets, that is,
currency in their pockets and balances in their trans-
action accounts.
In the aggregate, the desireto hold money balances
is determined primarily by four things: individuals’
wealth, the total amount of goods and services pro-
duced, the average price of goods and services, and
market interest rates. The first three factors are posi-
tively related to desired money holdings. Thus, to the
extent that each of these factors grows over time, de-
sired money balances also grow. The fourth factor,
market interest rates, when higher, induce individuals
and firms to reduce their money holdings to take ad-
vantage of higher earnings. In this regard, the rising
interest rates of the last two decades have worked to
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reduce the quantity of money demanded.3
If the stock of money in the economy exceeds the
quantity of money demanded, there is an excess sup-
ply or “too much” money in the economy. This means
that individuals would rather own more goods and
services than hold the “extra” money. The excess sup-
ply of money and the excess demand for goods and
services are two sides of the same problem. The excess
demand for goods and services indicates that individ-
uals would like to purchase more goods and services
than are presently available at current prices. With
output essentially fixed by the technology in place, the
imbalance shown by the excess supply of money and
the excess demand for goods can be eliminated only
if the average price of goods and services rises enough
to remove both the excess demand for goods and serv-
ices and the corresponding excess supply of money.
Thus, an excess supply of money naturally leads to
an increase in the average price of goods and serv-
ices. If, over an extended period, the money stock
grows at a faster rate than the quantity of money de-
manded, the average price of goods and services will
continue to increase, and the economy will experience
inflation. Inflation can be avoided if the growth in the
money stock is held equal to the growth in the quan-
tity of money demanded. This does not mean, how-
ever, that money stock growth must be zero to elimi-
nate inflation. As the economy grows, with more goods
and services being produced and consumed, and with
individuals becoming wealthier, the desire to hold
money balances will naturally grow. If the money
stock grows at the same rate as desired money bal-
ances, there will be no inflation.
In summary, inflation results only when, over a con-
siderable period of time, the money supply grows
faster than the desire to hold money balances. Accord-
ingto this view, federal deficits can cause inflationonly
if they lead to continual increases in the money supply
or to continual decreases in money demand. Both of
these alternatives are examined below.
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~Market interest rates, which determine the desire to hold
money balances, can be broken into two components, The
first component is a real rate of return, which measures the
increased command over goods and services that results from
postponing present consumption. The second component is a
compensation required for expected inflation. If individuals
expect a greater rate of inflation in the future, they require
that they be compensated for the deterioration in the pur-
chasing power of money, thus driving up the market rate of
return and reducing the desire to hold money balances, In
periods of hyperinflation, the latter component dominates the
decision to hold money and results in a ‘flight from the
domestic money. See Thomas J. Sargent, “The Ends of Four
Big Inflations,” Working Paper #158, Federal Reserve Bank
of Minneapolis (December 1980).FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS MARCH 1981
DEFICITS AND THE MONEY
SUPPLY PROCESS
As indicated before, federal government deficits do
not directly cause money growth. As a practical mat-
ter, however, government deficits can have an im-
portant indirect effect on money supply growth.
When the federal government spends more than it
takes in as revenue, the Treasury must finance the
deficit by borrowing in the private marketplace (sell-
ing government securities). The increased demand for
credit in financial markets, if not offset by a reduc-
tion in credit demand elsewhere or an increase in
credit supply, naturally puts upward pressure on all
market interest rates,4 Monetary authorities may then
attempt to prevent the rise in interest rates from
taking place.5
To do this, the Federal Reserve will buy govern-
ment securities, thus monetizing part of the public
debt by increasing the level of reserves. The increase
in bank reserves, as explained above, will result in a
larger money stock and, other things equal, a subse-
quently higher rate of inflation. Consequently, there is
an indirect channel — via the response of monetary
authorities to higher interest rates — by which deficits
can influence the inflation rate.
However, the existence of this indirect channel does
not indicate that deficits cause inflation. The deficits
~“What is clear in circumstances like these, when efforts to
restrain monetary growth confront strong private credit de-
mands, is that inevitably large new borrowings by the federal
government, whether to finance budgetary deficits or off-
budget programs, strongly aggravate Rressures on interest
rates,” Paul A. Volcker, Chaimmn, Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, before the Committee on Banking,
Housing, and urban Affairs, US. Senate, January 7, 1981.
The extent of this upward pressure will depend, in large
part, on the size of deficit relative to total savings. The larger
the deficit in comparison to the savings pool, the greater the
upward pressure on market interest rates. Thus, to the extent
that the tax cuts proposed by the Reagan administration lead
to increased savings, some of the pressure on interest rates
resulting from the anticipated deficits will he mitigated, For
an analysis of the effect of deficits on interest rates, see Rich-
ard W. Lang, “The 1975-76 Federal Deficits and the Credit
Market,” this Review (January 1977), pp. 9-16; and Michael
J. Hamburger and Burton Zwiek, “Checking Inflation in Spite
of a Deficit,” Business Week (March 23, 1981), pp. 12-15,
The reader is also referred to Adrian W, Throop, “Inflation
Premiunis, Budget Deficits,” Federal Reserve Bank of San
Francisco Weekly Letter (March 14, 1980), pp. 1-3, for an
interesting discussion of measuring the size of the deficit in
inflationary limes.
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Such attempts can occur either as a technical means of achiev-
ing a given money growth rate, or because monetary authori-
ties simply don’t want to see interest rates rise. While the
motivating factors behind the desire to stabilize interest rates
are not always clear, the impact of rising real govemment
borrowing on monetary policy will always be the same,
themselves do not increase the money stock; only
monetary authorities can do this. Only when mone-
tary authorities attempt to prevent market interest
rates from rising will deficits produce a larger money
supply. If deficits persist over an extended period of
time, Federal Reserve attempts to prevent market
interest rates from rising will result in continual in-
creases in the money stock. Viewed in this fashion,
inflation represents the cost associated with trying to
prevent market interest rates from rising.
Many have argued that such attempts to prevent
interest rates from rising are self-defeating because
market interest rates cannot be controlled over ex-
tended periods of time,°At best, as this argtunent
goes, the Federal Reserve can keep interest rates
from rising for only a short period of time by increas-
ing bank reserves and money growth. The inflation
that results from excessive money growth will itself
soon put upward pressure on interest rates. For the
purposes of this analysis, however, it is irrelevant
whether or not the Federal Reserve is “successful”
even in the short run. If they attempt to prevent
interest rates from rising at all, they will have estab-
lished a link between deficits and money growth, and
consequently, between deficits and inflation.
DEFICITS AND THE DEMAND
FOR MONEY
Inflation can also be associated with government
deficits if such deficits induce reductions in the pub-
lic’s desired money balances. There appear to be two
possible channels through which this might occur. The
first channel operates through the effect of changes in
interest rates on the public’s demand for money
balances. A higher level of interest rates will reduce
desired money balances, causing an excess supply of
money.
As a practical matter, this effect is minor. While
the demand for money is sensitive to changes in in-
terest rates, quantitatively the effect is small. It would
take a substantial rise in interest rates to reduce
desired money balances enough to actually produce
a measurable increase in inflation. One estimate indi-
cates that interest rates would have to increase 500
percent (for example, from 5 percent to 25 percent)
to induce the same amount of inflation associated
6
See “Fed Cannot Control Interest Rates Because That Is Not
Agency’s Role,” American Banker (January 26, 1981), text of
speech, “Why Can’t the Fed Control Interest Rates?” by
Lawrence K- Roos,
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with a permanent one percentage-point increase in
money supply growth.7
A second channel through which federal deficits
can affect desired money holdings — and the inflation
rate — is changing individuals’ wealth holdings. De-
sired money balances are positively related to an indi-
vidual’s wealth, Thus, if individuals observe their
wealth falling over an extended period of time, their
desired money balances will also fall, and higher infla-
tion will result despite the fact that the growth of the
money stock remains unchanged.
Can deficits themselves cause wealth to decline?
On an individual level, the answer is clearly no.
When the federal government spends more than its
direct receipts, some individuals must reduce their
current consumption of goods and services. In our
country, this reduction is made willingly in exchange
for government securities — promises to repay the
loan in the future that are backed by the taxing
authority of the federal government. Thus, those indi-
viduals who forsake current expenditure to hold gov-
ernment debt should not be worse off or poorer,
because they are doing so voluntarily.
Even though each individual holding government
debt is at least as well off as before, it is entirely
possible that economic participants, on an aggregate
level, feel worse off. This could happen, for example,
if the public feels that the federal government is in-
efficiently using the resources it has acquired through
deficit financing.8 Such perceptions could have signifi-
cant wealth effects if it were commonly perceived
that the government was taking away from (“crowd-
ing out”) private investment, which would have
added to the capital structure of the economy, without
adding anything significant by way of public spend-
ing in return, People would perceive future private
production capabilities as lower and, if this were not
offset by an equivalent benefit from public spending,
would feel poorer as a result.
While such adverse wealth effects are possible, they
are the direct result of fiscal mismanagement, not
deficit financing. The public could be made to feel
equally worse off, if the federal government were to
raise taxes to finance spending programs that the
public deemed worthless. As long as the federal gov-
ernment allocates resources inefficiently, the public
will be poorer. This is true regardless of how the re-
sources are obtained, that is, through taxation or debt
issuance. On the other hand, if the public approves
of the federal government expenditures, it makes little
difference whether the resources are obtained from
current taxes or from the issuance of debt which will
be paid off by future taxes.9
Federal deficits are associated with declining wealth
only to the extent that they are symptomatic of a
governmental misallocation of resources. In this re-
spect, efforts to legislate a balanced federal budget
are attacking the symptom of the problem (whether
real or imaginary) instead of the problem itself. If the
public perceives that its wealth is falling, it is the
result of mismanagement of fiscal responsibilities, not
deficit spending.
In summary, it appears that deficits have little ef-
fect on the desire to hold money balances. As a result,
inflation is not significantly linked to deficits through
their impact on money demand.
DEFICITS, MONEY AND INFLATION:
EXAMINING THE THEORY
The analysis of this article suggests that inflation
is a result of an excess growth of money in the
economy. Deficits are associated with inflation only
to the extent that they lead to increases in the money
stock. To examine this theory in relation to the experi-
ence of the last 25 years, let’s consider the popular
alternative explanation of inflation, namely, that fed-
eral government deficits directly cause inflation.
°Thisargument presumes that the public recognizes the “pay
inc now or pay me later” choice between a current tax hike
and the issuance of debt. In other words, when the public
sees the federal government issue debt, it recognizes that fu-
ture taxes must he raised to pay off the increase in debt. See
Neil A. Stevens, “Govemment Debt Financing — Its Effects
in View of Tax Discounting,” this Review (July 1979), pp.
11-19.
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R. W. Hafer and Scott E. Hem, “Evidence on the Temporal
Stability of the Demand for Money Relationship in the United
States,’ this Review (December 1979), pp. 3-14.
Some would argue that the size of the federal deficit is
closely watched and figures importantly in the formation of
individuals’ inflationary expectations. If deficits grow in size,
individuals will expect more inflation (driving market interest
rates up) and, as such, will reduce their desired money bal-
ances. However, this article argues that there is no direct
link between deficits and inflation, Thus, individuals who ex-
pect more inflation as a result of larger deficits alone are
acting irrationally. The crucial question regarding future infla-
lion is the extent to which the deficits are monetized. If the
deficit is not monetized, future inflation will not result. Defi-
cits, per se, are not inflationary; thus, the proposition that
individuals will fonn inflation expectations based on the size
of the deficit alone is not viable as a long-mn proposition.
5
This effect seems to have been important in European cases of
hyperinflation following World War I, as many defeated
countries ran sizable deficits to make reparations to the World
War I victors. See Sargent, “The Ends of Four Big Inflalions.”
6FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS MARCH 1981
First, consider the relationship between federal
deficits and money stock growth. Chart 1 shows the
relationship between the federal government debt
(which rises when the government rnns deficits and
falls when it runs surpluses) and the money stock
over the last 25 years. From 1955 through 1974, growth
rates of the federal debt and the money stock move
in tandem, generally accelerating through early 1973.
This accelerating pattern is then broken, as the
growth of both debt and money stock slows some-
what from early 1973 through early 1975— ironically
enough, a period of recession in which one would
anticipate an increase in debt.
The growth rate of the money stock always exceeds
the growth rate of the federal debt from 1955 through
early 1975, as the Federal Reserve increased the por-
tion of the federal debt it held (see the third tier in
chart 1). Over this period, the Federal Reserve pur-
chased federal debt at a faster rate than the federal
government issued it. This means that bank reserves
grew at faster rates than the federal debt and, thus,
the money supply expanded faster than the debt.’°
The experience over this period is fully consistent with
the notion that the Federal Reserve was attempting to
offset the upward pressure on market interest rates
that resulted from the accelerating issuance of federal
debt; acceleration in the growth of the federal debt
was paralleled by an acceleration in money stock
growth.
In 1975, however, there was a clear break in the
prevailing relationship between the federal debt and
the money stock. From 1975 through 1980, the fed-
eral debt grew at a 13.0 percent rate, more than twice
its growth rate from 1967 to 1974. Money growth did
not accelerate to this extent, rising at a 7.1 percent
rate from 1975 through 1980, only slightly above the
6.1 percent rate from 1967 to 1974.
Thus, the period 1975-80 was the first sustained
period since the accord in which the money stock
grew at a slower rate than the federal debt. This
drastic change occurred because the Federal Reserve
did not continue its past practice of increasing the
proportion of the federal debt that it held. In fact,
the Federal Reserve did just the opposite. The pro-
portion of the federal debt held by the Federal Re-
serve fell from ahnost 24 percent in 1974 to less than
moThe relationship between federal debt held by the Federal
Reserve and money growth is not necessarily a perfectly
stable one. To the extent that the Federal Reserve changes
reserve requirements, a given stock of bank reserves results
in a different money stock.
18 percent in 1980. Either the increase in the federal
debt over this period did not put auxiliary upward
pressure on market interest rates or the Federal Re-
serve became less concerned with keeping interest
rates down and more directly concerned with money
growth itself. In either case, the close correlation be-
tween debt and money growth was broken.
With this relationship between the federal debt
and the money stock in mind, consider the two alter-
native causes of inflation: (1) excess money growth
and (2) federal deficits. If the first alternative is cor-
rect, growth in the federal debt should generally
underpredict inflation over the 1955-74 period and
overpredict inflation thereafter compared to the rela-
tionship between money growth and inflation. This
should occur because debt grew slower than money
over the early period and faster than money there-
after. If the second alternative is correct, the relation-
ship between inflation and growth of the federal debt
should be closer than that between inflation and
money growth.
Chart 2 shows the relationship between inflation,
money growth and the growth in the federal debt
over the last 25 years. All rates are measured on a
compounded annual rate basis. Inflation is measured
by the four-quarter rate of change in the implicit
CNP deflator. Money growth is measured by the 12-
quarter rate of change in M1B. This extended period
accounts for the fact that only sustained periods of
excess money growth result in inflation.’ These obser-
vations were lagged two quarters because money
growth has little or no immediate effect on inflation.
Debt growth is similarly measured on a 12-quarter
basis. Lagging the debt measure did not appreciably
improve its relationship with inflation, so it is charted
on a contemporaneoth basis.
The chart shows clearly that money growth is more
closely related to inflation than is the growth in the
federal debt. More important, the two propositions
from our theory are borne out. Specifically, relative
to money growth, the growth in the federal debt
underpredicts inflation over the period 1955-74 and
overpredicts inflation over the period 1975-80. Over
the early period, inflation averaged 3.4 percent, the
money growth measure averaged 3.5 percent and the
debt growth measure averaged 2.1 percent. Over the
latter period, inflation averaged 7.5 percent, money
tm1
For a more technical analysis of this lag, see Keith NI. Carl-
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Chart 2







Li Data are two-period lag of three-year growth rates.
2 GNP deflator. Data are one-year growth roles.
Li Total debt, not including debt held by U.S. agencies and trusts. Data are three-year growth rates.
latest data plotted: 4th quarter
growth, 6.4 percent, and debt growth, 11.5 percent.12
This evidence then is consistent with the theory that
inflation is caused by excessive money growth. On
tm2
The reader can see that money growth underpredicts infialion
by a sizable amount over the period 1974-76. This is the
result of a one-time wealth loss following the significant oil
price increases of late 1973 and early 1974, The wealth loss
resulted in reductions in the quantity of money demanded
and, as a result, inflation was greater than money growth
alone would suggest. A similar phenomenon is observed in
the other hand, the evidence is not consistent with
the view that increases in the federal debt (i.e.,
deficits) cause inflation.
1980, but on a smaller scale. For technical discussions of this
effect, see Denis S. Kamosky, “The Link Between Money
and Prices — 1971-76,” this Review (June 1976), pp. 17-23;
and Robert Fl. Rasche and John A. Tatom, “Energy Re-
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION because monetary authorities have shown more con-
This article has described how federal deficits could
cause inflation within a monetary framework. The
potential link between federal deficits and inflation
has been traced throngh the impact of deficits on the
money stock and on the desire to hold money. It
was argued that the link between deficits and money
growth is not a causal one, in the sfrict sense of the
word; that is, deficits need not directly cause increases
in the money stock. Only when monetary authorities
attempt to prevent interest rates from rising will fed-
eral deficits lead to increases in the money stock and,
subsequently, inflation. This link was apparently im-
portant from 1955 through early 1975. More recently,
however, the link appears to have been broken, either
cern about money growth and less about the level of
interest rates or because recent deficits have not put
undue pressure on market interest rates. Over the
period 1975 to 1980, the rate of increase in the federal
debt has been almost twice that of money growth and
inflation.
Two possible channels by which deficits could re-
duce the desire to hold money balances were also
detailed. These channels, operating through rising
market interest rates and reduced wealth, are direct
conduits by which deficits could directly lead to infla-
tion. Neither of these channels, however, is relevant
to recent inflation in the United States.
10